



Interview Summary: Chief Superintendent Carson Pardy (Ontario Provincial Police)

Chief Superintendent Carson Pardy was interviewed by Frank Au, Mark Pritchard, Eric Brousseau, Misha Boutilier, Sajeda Hedaraly, and Etienne Lacombe on August 11 and September 26, 2022. Questions about this summary should be directed to Frank Au.

Background

Background on Chief Superintendent Pardy

Chief Superintendent Pardy was the commander of the North East Region of the Ontario Provincial Police (**OPP**) at the time of the Freedom Convoy. North East Region runs from West Parry Sound to the James Bay coast to the Town of Mattawa in the East and Manitoulin and up to Wawa/White River in the West. Before he began serving as North East Region commander in 2020, he served for 28 years in OPP's East Region, which includes Ottawa. On February 7, he began to serve as the lead of the Integrated Planning Cell (the **Cell**) that assisted the Ottawa Police Service (**OPS**) during the Freedom Convoy. He continued in that role until the end of the Freedom Convoy. He retired from OPP in September 2022.

Chief Superintendent Pardy is a formerly active/trained Critical Incident Commander (**CIC**). He served as a commander during the 2010 Huntsville G8 Summit, as a liaison commander during the 2010 Toronto G20 Summit, and as lead planner and commander for numerous presidential visits in Ottawa. During his time in OPP's East Region, he was also a member of INTERSECT, a body that coordinates inter-agency responses to major events in the National Capital Region, for several years.

Chief Superintendent Pardy had experience working with OPS on major events before the Freedom Convoy. He indicated that OPS was renowned for and skilled at planning for major events and protests, which occurred frequently in Ottawa. However, many of the OPS officers he had worked with on major events had retired by the time of the Freedom Convoy and he was unaware if they had been replaced. He believes that the lack of major events in Ottawa as a result of the COVID-19 Pandemic may have been a factor in OPS planning capacity. Further, Ottawa had not experienced presidential visits since the 2016 Presidential Visit and North American Leaders Summit.

Role of PLT and POU

OPP and certain other Ontario police services have public order units (**POUs**). POUs are teams of officers with specialized training to manage protests and control crowds. They are composed of frontline officers and in the case of the OPP specifically, Emergency Response Team members and therefore cannot be deployed at a moment's notice.



Because they are emergency responders, they cannot all be deployed at the same time (e.g., there could be a critical incident/hostage or an armed robbery).

OPP has a Provincial Liaison Team (**PLT**), and certain other Ontario police services have a Public Liaison Team, the equivalent of PLT. PLT is an invaluable negotiating group that has historically aided in many contentious issues, from negotiations with a wide range of individuals or groups, including both anarchists and peaceful protestors. PLT plays a vital role in delivering messages from the police and others to protest leaders and reporting back protest leaders' responses to police commanders. PLT ensures that police commanders are aware of protest leaders' requests to police and that protest leaders know what conduct police expect them to engage in or refrain from if police grant their requests. It is important that command provide PLT authority in its discussions with protest leaders or groups to gain trust from protestors. Command must have confidence that PLT has good reasons to ask protestors to perform certain actions in order to achieve the goal of PLT involvement.

Pre-Integrated Planning Cell Role

The Freedom Convoy travelled through North East Region en route to Ottawa and OPP had teams monitoring it. Chief Superintendent Pardy was aware of the Freedom Convoy before it arrived in Ottawa and participated in calls concerning the convoy leading up to its arrival in Ottawa.

Creation of the Integrated Planning Cell

On February 7 at 7:43 p.m., OPP Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins called Chief Superintendent Pardy and assigned him to lead the Integrated Planning Cell. Chief Superintendent Pardy understood that he was selected to lead the Cell because of his experience working in the National Capital Region on major events, training and experience as a CIC. He understood that non-OPS police leaders decided to create the Cell to support OPS and ensure that all assisting agencies were contributing at the highest level. He does not know whether the decision to create the Cell was made with OPS input. He understood that OPS was the police service of jurisdiction and the lead agency, and that the Cell would be located in Ottawa to assist OPS.

Chief Superintendent Pardy explained that the word "integrated" in the Cell's title referred to the presence of multiple agencies. OPS had requested significant support and no one agency could supply all the necessary support. Before the Cell's creation, any resources supplied to the OPS were supplied under OPS command and control.

Officers from OPP, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (**RCMP**), York Regional Police (**YRP**), Peel Regional Police (**PRP**), and Toronto Police Service (**TPS**) participated in the Cell. OPP Superintendent Abrams and Inspector Michael Francis were East Region OPP officers who had been involved in the response to the Freedom Convoy before they joined



the Cell. OPP Emergency Manager Brad Taylor also joined the Cell. RCMP supplied two members with significant backgrounds in public order and incident command, Superintendent Phil Lue and Sergeant Darwin Tetreault. Another participant, YRP Inspector Tim Skinner, had a background in public order planning. PRP contributed Inspector Thomas Warfield. TPS contributed two members who are outstanding emergency management planners, Sergeant Arleen Duffy and Constable Isabel Ethier. The Cell brought a lot of expertise, flexibility in decision-making and subject matter experts supporting an operational plan to end the protests.

February 8 at 9:00 a.m. Briefing by Commissioner Carrique and Deputy Commissioner Harkins

On February 8 at 9:00 a.m., Chief Superintendent Pardy attended a briefing in OPP's Orillia headquarters with Commissioner Carrique, Deputy Commissioner Harkins, Superintendent Mike McDonell, and Superintendent Craig Abrams. During the meeting, Chief Superintendent Pardy learned that the Cell's mandate was to support OPS and rebuild trust in it, develop a plan that complemented OPS's command, and bring an end to the protests. He understood that the public had lost trust in OPS because it perceived that the Freedom Convoy protestors were going unchecked. Commissioner Carrique and Deputy Commissioner Harkins told him that OPS was asking OPP for more and more officers, but that OPS lacked an operational plan to deploy the 1600-1800 officers it was requesting.

During the above briefing, Superintendent McDonell informed Chief Superintendent Pardy that OPP had established POU hubs to coordinate the deployment of POUs across the province. Before the Freedom Convoy, POU hubs did not exist. They were created during the Freedom Convoy and proved invaluable. They allowed police to be more strategic in deploying limited POU resources and ensured that police would have capacity to deploy POUs elsewhere in Ontario and would not be caught flat-footed if additional protests occurred. Police would not have been able to obtain the 1,800 officers their plan needed without knowing what was going on in other parts of the province.

Superintendent Abrams informed Chief Superintendent Pardy during the briefing that there were fundamental leadership concerns in OPS. Specifically, Superintendent Abrams told Chief Superintendent Pardy that a lead public order and emergency management OPS officer resigned his internal position over unrealistic expectations and was replaced. Chief Superintendent Pardy was concerned. He noted that on a few occasions during the Freedom Convoy significant OPS officers walked away due to unbearable stress. During the interview, he observed that OPS switched Event Commanders on three occasions during the Freedom Convoy.

Chief Superintendent Pardy learned during the briefing that OPS was not providing a supportive environment for PLT and that PLT was not being properly operationalized. OPS was involving PLT in fuel seizures, which he considered to be improper.



Chief Superintendent Pardy was informed during the briefing that his and the Cell's contact at OPS was to be Inspector Debbie Palmer. However, when he arrived in Ottawa he learned that Inspector Palmer was not able to provide the Cell with the resources/support it needed.

Arrival in Ottawa and Initial Meeting with OPS on February 8

Chief Superintendent Pardy arrived in Ottawa on February 8. Some of the Cell members were already present, including Inspector Skinner, Superintendent Lue, and Sergeant Tetreault. There were no OPS members on the Cell initially, but the team made several requests for OPS members early on as they did not want to reinvent the OPS's plan.

The Cell based itself in RCMP National Headquarters' National Operations Centre (**NOC**) instead of the National Capital Region Command Centre (**NCRCC**), which did not have the resources the Cell needed. NCRCC is a physical space at a different RCMP facility in Orleans that Chief Superintendent Pardy had previously worked at NCRCC when he participated in major events in Ottawa. Eventually OPS members joined the Cell at the NOC.

Upon arrival in Ottawa, Chief Superintendent Pardy did not perceive any of the integration that had characterized previous major events in Ottawa. OPS was familiar with integrated planning and command from the presidential visits and had used INTERSECT to facilitate that, but he did not witness any of that. Instead, he perceived that INTERSECT had lost its weight. During the interview, he commented that it was unrealistic for OPS to make unilateral decisions and avoid unified command because OPP, RCMP, and other police agencies were providing three times more officers on the ground than OPS was.

Chief Superintendent Pardy's first order of business was meeting with the OPS and reviewing their current plan to help build on it. At 5:35 p.m. on February 8, he met with OPS Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson and OPS's Event Commander, Superintendent Mark Patterson, at the RCMP National Headquarters. He understood that Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson was the OPS strategic commander and that Superintendent Patterson was the operational commander. Chief Sloly was scheduled to attend the meeting but could not attend.

During the meeting, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson presented a document titled "OPS Strategic Concept of Operations—Ottawa Truck Demonstration 2022" (the **February 8 SCO**) to the Cell.¹ This document was a strategic concept of operations, not a plan. It outlined the different stages of OPS's expected operations. Chief Superintendent Pardy requested that OPS provide a full operations plan so that his team could build on it.

During this meeting, Chief Superintendent Pardy asked Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson if OPS would consider establishing an integrated command structure. Chief Superintendent Pardy knew OPS officers who thought this was a good idea, and OPS had employed

¹ OPS00008518.



integrated command in the past through INTERSECT. He later had a conversation with Chief Sloly about what integration means. OPP did not intend to and did not take control of the situation, and OPS remained the lead agency throughout the Freedom Convoy.

Chief Superintendent Pardy emphasized the importance of communications and logistics during this meeting. He observed that communications and logistics can be critical points of failure, such as if not all officers have radios that are interoperable. OPS was able to ensure that officers could communicate with each other because it had 1200 RCMP radios.

February 9 at 12:05 p.m. Meeting with OPS

Lead-Up to the Meeting

On the morning of February 9, the Cell held a meeting. It had not received the plan requested the previous day. The Cell learned that OPS Superintendent Chris Rheaume had been assigned to liaise with the Cell, but he had limited knowledge because he had not been involved with OPS's planning. The Cell needed information on OPS's plan to support OPS, but that everyone in OPS needed Chief Sloly's approval before sharing the plan. OPS was not making information and resources available to the Cell during its first few days in Ottawa, which delayed the Cell's work.

Discussions with Chief Sloly at the Meeting

On February 9 at 12:05 p.m., Chief Superintendent Pardy and some of the Cell's members met with Chief Sloly at the OPS Headquarters at 474 Elgin Street. Chief Sloly's counsel attended the meeting and numerous other meetings that Chief Superintendent Pardy participated in at Chief Sloly's request. When meetings with the Cell were conducted by telephone or virtually, Chief Sloly made the Cell aware that OPS's counsel was present. Chief Superintendent Pardy found the presence of counsel at police operational meetings to be unusual. It was stressed that the Cell was there to help OPS.

Chief Superintendent Pardy described Chief Sloly as passionate at the meeting. Chief Sloly indicated that he wanted to successfully resolve the situation and did not want to let Ottawa down. Chief Superintendent Pardy knew that Chief Sloly was under tremendous pressure and he and his family were receiving death threats.

During the meeting, Chief Sloly told the Cell that if police could fix Ottawa, they would also fix the nation. Chief Superintendent Pardy and his team did not agree. They thought police actions in Ottawa could lead to reactions by protestors elsewhere in Canada.

During the meeting, Superintendent Abrams challenged Chief Sloly about OPS's failure to use PLT. Chief Superintendent Pardy recalled that Chief Sloly indicated that he was not overly familiar with the role of PLT.



Chief Superintendent Pardy had difficulty determining whether Chief Sloly was supportive of a unified command during the meeting and following it. Chief Superintendent Pardy had expected OPS to thank the Cell for coming to assist, but he never heard that from Chief Sloly during or following the meeting. Chief Sloly appeared to want OPS to end the Freedom Convoy on its own terms if it could. Chief Superintendent Pardy subsequently engaged in many discussions with OPS senior command about Chief Sloly's lack of support for the integrated direction the Cell wanted to pursue.

Assessment of the February 8 SCO and the February 9 Plan

During this meeting, OPS provided the Cell with the February 8 SCO and a 24-page document titled "Ottawa Truck Demonstration '22, 9 February 2022" (the **February 9 Plan**).² Chief Superintendent Pardy characterized the February 9 Plan as the skeleton of a plan. It outlined a concept of operations and a seven-point strategy: (1) negotiations; (2) surge, enforce & contain; (3) intelligence & investigations; (4) red zone reduction; (5) 24/7-hour cycles; (6) resource reliability, and (7) establishing success factors. Chief Superintendent Pardy found the plan to be useful information but not a real plan. He again asked OPS for its operations plan so that the Cell could build on it. During the interview, he observed that mobilizing people from across the country, requires more than numbers. A plan should drive the numbers but here the numbers were driving the plan. Chief Sloly had requested 1800 officers to come to Ottawa to assist, but he seemed to want to figure out what to do with those officers when they arrived rather than before they arrived.

Chief Superintendent Pardy determined during the meeting that the February 8 SCO and the February 9 Plan had different mission statements. The February 8 SCO contained the following mission statement:³

The Ottawa Police Service, in a collaborative approach with other police agencies, federal, provincial and city partners, community organizations and the event organizers will provide a safe and secure environment in the City of Ottawa during the Freedom Convoy 2022 event. The primary goal is to end the protest peacefully. This may be achieved through proactive engagements by all officers including Police Liaison Teams, facilitating communication, de-escalation and negotiation as means to achieving a peaceful resolution.

In contrast, the February 9 Plan contained the following mission statement:⁴

To end the unlawful elements of the Ottawa Truck Demonstration and restore safe and open neighborhoods and businesses.

The February 8 SCO contemplated ending the Freedom Convoy protest entirely, while the February 9 Plan only contemplated ending the unlawful elements of that protest. The

² OPP00000774 at PDF pp. 91-113.

³ OPS00008518 at PDF p. 2.

⁴ OPP00000774 at PDF p. 96.



Cell identified the discrepancy between the two mission statements to OPS, which corrected the discrepancy and ensured that there was a single mission statement. Chief Superintendent Pardy stated during the interview that it is important for all officers to be operating under a single mission statement.

Chief Superintendent Pardy was also concerned that neither the February 8 SCO nor the February 9 Plan contained supporting sub-plans, such as public order, crime action, and traffic plans, along with plans to shut down the downtown core. He indicated that crime actions needed to happen concurrently with POU actions, not after those actions, and that the crime action plan needed to be embedded in the operational plan.

The February 9 Plan contemplated clearing protest sites chunk-by-chunk. Chief Superintendent Pardy was concerned that OPS was only planning to dismantle these sites but had no plan to hold them and sustain operations. In all major events he had participated in, police had planned to hold and sustain areas they cleared.

Discussions of Rideau-Sussex Operation

Specifically, Chief Superintendent Pardy was concerned OPS had not properly planned for the first operation the February 9 Plan contemplated, an operation to clear the intersection of Rideau Street and Sussex Drive that OPS intended to launch on February 10 at 6:00 a.m. OPS had not outlined which officers and units would be involved, how they would be staged, the role of POU and PLT, command and control, decision-making authorities, or how to deal with trucks. OPS planned on using OPS employees to drive the vehicles, which is a significant risk given they are not trained to move heavy vehicles and that intelligence revealed some vehicles had been demobilized. There was no planning for PLT to conduct messaging or allowance for people to leave.

During the meeting, Chief Superintendent Pardy and his colleagues raised concerns and posed questions about the Rideau-Sussex plan. They asked about POU's ability to contain the area once police would take the intersection. Sergeant Tetreault said there were not enough POU officers to do this safely. It would have taken about 800 POU officers to effectively manage the protest, which is approximately how many were ultimately deployed. Chief Superintendent Pardy noted that OPS lacked towing resources but that the Ontario Ministry of Transportation (**MTO**) could assist with obtaining towing. OPP had already started working on a towing plan at the time and was working directly with MTO.

As Chief Superintendent Pardy and Superintendent Lue left the meeting, they met with OPS's assigned Incident Commander for the Rideau-Sussex plan, Acting Superintendent Paul Burnett. He informed them that he wanted to consult with the other POU commanders before proceeding with the plan. Later that day, the Rideau-Sussex plan was deferred because the POU commanders determined that it could not proceed safely with the resources currently at OPS's disposal.



Post-Meeting Discussion with Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson

Later on February 9, Chief Superintendent Pardy spoke with Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson about working in a unified command structure. She supported unified command. He described her as a voice of reason and a good listener whom he could speak with openly.

February 10-11: Cell's Development of Plan

On February 10, Inspector Beaudin updated the Cell on the status of PLT work in Ottawa. Inspector Beaudin told the Cell that disjointedness caused by OPS's command structure and inconsistent messaging put out by the OPS corporate communications team was undermining PLT's work.

On February 10, Sergeant Tetreault presented a high-level concept of operations to the Cell. That plan contemplated four phases: (1) stabilization, (2) action, (3) maintenance, and (4) demobilization. The Cell continued to develop that plan after February 10.

On February 11, Chief Superintendent Pardy and Superintendent Lue presented the Cell's plan at a high level to Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson. This plan contemplated implementing a unified command, which Chief Superintendent Pardy thought would improve efficiency. She was very supportive of the plan, and the Cell sent her a PowerPoint deck outlining the plan following the presentation.⁵ Superintendent Bernier, who replaced Superintendent Patterson as OPS's operational commander on February 11, was also supportive.

February 12 at 3:10 p.m. Command Call

The Cell hoped to receive a response from OPS concerning its plan on the evening of February 11 but had not received one by 11:45 a.m. on February 12. At that time, Chief Superintendent Pardy called Chief Sloly, advised him of the Cell's desire to establish integrated command, and informed him that the Cell had provided Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson with a PowerPoint deck outlining the Cell's plan, which contemplated a unified command. Chief Sloly indicated that he was not sure how the integration the Cell's plan contemplated was to happen and what it would look like and that a call to get on the same page about integration would be a good idea. After Chief Superintendent Pardy's call with Chief Sloly, he learned that Superintendent Bernier had spoken with Chief Sloly and that the Cell was good to proceed with the plan. Chief Superintendent Pardy believed that Superintendent Bernier was under a misimpression and that there was confusion within OPS about Chief Sloly's attitude toward the plan because Chief Sloly had just told Chief Superintendent Pardy that he needed a call to understand the Cell's plan and what integration would look like.

⁵ OPS00010519, -520.



Chief Sloly's request for a briefing on integration and the Cell's plan was part of a pattern of a behaviour that led Chief Superintendent Pardy to conclude that nothing was approved at OPS until Chief Sloly said so. OPS officers told Chief Superintendent Pardy and others in the Cell that Chief Sloly influenced every decision that was taken, whether directly or by perception. Chief Sloly frequently faulted his team for not informing him of things. This created a dysfunctional atmosphere for the Cell. The Cell would hear that decisions were approved, only to later learn that Chief Sloly had not approved them. The Cell at times asked Chief Sloly if he had empowered anyone at OPS to approve decisions. Chief Sloly's need to approve every decision was not how OPP operated and was contrary to the role of the Event Commander, who should have autonomy to make operational decisions.

On February 12 at 3:10 p.m., Chief Superintendent Pardy and the Cell joined a Microsoft Teams call in progress with Chief Sloly and his command team. At the time they joined the call, Chief Sloly was addressing his command team disrespectfully. Chief Superintendent Pardy offered to have the Cell drop off the call so that Chief Sloly could address his command team privately. Chief Sloly declined this request. This and other actions by Chief Sloly made it apparent to Chief Superintendent Pardy that Chief Sloly did not trust his command team and subject matter experts. He told the Cell that he trusted them, but the Cell knew that he did not. Chief Sloly's lack of trust in his command team was contrary to major incident commander (**MIC**) or CIC training, which teaches the importance of trusting subject matter experts and making strategic decisions on their advice. Chief Superintendent Pardy did not know if Chief Sloly received MIC or CIC training. He recalled that Chief Sloly told OPP that he did not have a lot of experience as a MIC.

During the call, Sergeant Tetreault presented a slide deck of the Cell's plan, which included a measured approach and a vital PLT communication and negotiation plan. The presentation stressed the role of PLT because Chief Superintendent Pardy was concerned about a lack of buy-in at OPS to the PLT role. At the end of the call, Chief Sloly stated that he had given explicit approval two days ago to getting a proper PLT negotiation plan embedded and a proper command structure, but that he had not seen that until today. Chief Superintendent Pardy was not aware why there was a delay in creating a proper PLT negotiation plan and proper command structure. He recalled that Chief Sloly told him at one point during the Freedom Convoy that PLT did not work. Chief Superintendent Pardy's view was that PLT did work but that Chief Sloly did not provide PLT the autonomy it needed to engage with protestors and did not approve PLT's actions when PLT sought his approval.

The Cell also stressed the importance of unified command during the Cell and explained how unified command would work. Chief Sloly did not respond overly well. The Cell was looking for him to approve unified command during this call, but he did not voice approval.



Development and Approval of the February 13 Plan

Chief Superintendent Pardy described February 13 as a turning point. By February 12, the Cell had developed a 73-page plan titled “Integrated Mobilization Operational Plan” (the **February 13 Plan**).⁶ Unlike the February 9 plan, this was a very detailed concept of operations that outlined how OPS, OPP, and RCMP would approach the situation from start-to-finish. It included the same four phases as the February 10 high-level concept of operations. Chief Superintendent Pardy and Superintendent Lue approved this plan on behalf of OPP and RCMP. On February 13, Chief Superintendent Pardy was looking for a senior OPS officer to approve the plan on behalf of OPS.

The February 13 Plan contained the following mission statement:⁷

Using an integrated response, the Ottawa Police and policing partners will keep the peace, enforce legislation, and maintain public safety for the duration of the Ottawa Truck Demonstration, with the utmost respect to the individuals Charter of Rights and Freedoms with priority on community and emergency services personnel safety & wellbeing.

Chief Superintendent Pardy indicated this mission statement was designed to achieve a delicate balance between respecting the law and minimizing harm to protestors, community members, and officers. He believes that OPS, OPP, and RCMP achieved this goal. He characterized this mission statement as encompassing the entirety of the event and incorporating parts of the mission statements in the February 8 SCO and the February 9 Plan.

The February 13 Plan also contained a command-and-control chart, which is reproduced below:⁸


⁶ OPP00001851.

⁷ *Id.* at p. 8.

⁸ *Id.* at p. 22.



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The chart displayed dotted lines between the OPS commanders and the RCMP and OPP commanders at the strategic level of command. Chief Superintendent Pardy indicated that these dotted lines indicated that OPS was the lead agency and that there was not equal decision-making authority between OPS on the one hand, and OPP and RCMP on the other hand. However, there was a solid line between Superintendent Bernier and his Deputy Event Commander, OPP Inspector Dave Springer. OPS, RCMP, and OPP established a gold-silver-bronze command structure that clearly established the roles of officers in the command structure and how information would be briefed up and down that structure.

On February 13 at 3:50 p.m., Chief Superintendent Pardy received a call from Superintendent Bernier, who was accompanied by Inspector Springer. Superintendent Bernier reviewed the February 13 Plan and indicated that he approved it, and Chief Superintendent Pardy thanked him. There were still some outstanding concerns, including concerns expressed by Inspector Springer, but the Cell was continuing to work on those concerns. Later that day, at 6:05 p.m., Chief Superintendent Pardy spoke with Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, who confirmed that Superintendent Bernier had authority to approve the February 13 Plan. After this conversation, Chief Superintendent Pardy was not concerned that Chief Sloly had not approved the plan.



February 14-15: Challenges to the Implementation of the February 13 Plan

Discussions about OPS Legal Review or Approval of February 13 Plan

On February 14 at 1:30 p.m., Superintendent Bernier told Chief Superintendent Pardy that he was concerned that the OPS general counsel, Christine Huneault, needed to approve the February 13 Plan before Superintendent Bernier could action it.⁹ Chief Superintendent Pardy was equally concerned. During his career, he had never seen a lawyer review and approve an operational plan, which should be independent of political and legal approval. Instead, he would consult with counsel about any legal issues related to the plan to ensure that the plan was supported by legal authority and would implement anything that flowed from that discussion.

On February 14 at 1:49 p.m., Chief Superintendent Pardy advised Superintendent Rheame of Superintendent Bernier's concern that Ms. Huneault needed to approve the February 13 Plan.¹⁰ Chief Superintendent Pardy asked Superintendent Rheame to contact Ms. Huneault and advise her that the OPP's counsel was already addressing legal matters related to the plan and that they could connect.

On February 14 at 1:56 p.m., Superintendent Rheame advised Chief Superintendent Pardy that he had spoken with Ms. Huneault and that she told him that her role was not to approve any operational plan.¹¹ Chief Superintendent Pardy does not recall if he passed this information along to Superintendent Bernier. He observed that it was still clear to him that OPS wanted Ms. Huneault to review the plan before it was actioned. He viewed this as akin to an approval process, since he understood that the plan could not be actioned until Ms. Huneault had reviewed it. He recalled that Superintendent Bernier stated during a February 14 at 6:11 p.m. briefing that evening that Ms. Huneault's approval for a weekend public order strategy was required.¹²

Chief Superintendent Pardy recalled that the Cell was continually hearing from OPS that it wanted to speak with legal before moving forward with plans. This pattern of behaviour seemed to continue after Chief Sloly resigned.

Briefings of Chief Sloly by Superintendent Bernier

Chief Superintendent Pardy was attempting to work with Superintendent Bernier on finalizing the plan on February 14, but Superintendent Bernier was being pulled away continually to brief Chief Sloly. Chief Superintendent Pardy's viewed this as problematic because Superintendent Bernier's focus needed to be on operations, not on briefing Chief Sloly.

⁹ OPP00001784 at PDF pp. 13-14.

¹⁰ *Id.* at PDF p. 14.

¹¹ *Id.* at PDF pp. 14-15.

¹² *Id.* at PDF p. 33.



Potential Briefing of Ottawa Police Services Board

On February 14, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson invited Chief Superintendent Pardy and Superintendent Lue to present the February 13 Plan and the integrated command it contemplated to the Ottawa City Council and the Ottawa Police Services Board. They declined the invitation because they considered it inappropriate to brief politicians on operational matters. During the interview, Chief Superintendent Pardy also commented that OPS command-level officers were spending significant amounts of time briefing the Ottawa Police Services Board, which hindered their ability to oversee OPS's response to the Freedom Convoy.

On February 15, Commissioner Carrique asked Chief Superintendent Pardy to attend the Ottawa Police Services Board and brief the Board. He was told to provide a high-level briefing on operations, consistent with the guidelines set out in the June 2012 Independent Civilian Review into Matters Relating to the G20 Summit by the Honourable John W. Morden.¹³ This briefing was cancelled after Chief Sloly resigned.

Before the Board meeting was cancelled, Chief Superintendent Pardy understood from conversations with Chief Sloly and various OPS officers that there was an expectation the February 13 Plan needed to be presented to the Board before it could be actioned. Chief Superintendent Pardy thus understood the presentation to the Board to be akin to an approval process by the Board.

Impact of February 14 at 6:11 p.m. Briefing on Integrated Planning and Command

On February 14 at 6:11 p.m., Superintendent Bernier met with Chief Superintendent Pardy and the Cell and briefed them on a plan to launch an operation to remove trucks from side streets that had not moved to Wellington St. pursuant to a negotiation between Ottawa Mayor Jim Watson and certain Freedom Convoy leaders.¹⁴ The plan was based on Mayor Watson's decision to negotiate with Freedom Convoy leaders. The Cell challenged Superintendent Bernier on whether the plan was supported by intelligence and whether enough resources were in place to sustain it. Following significant discussion, Superintendent Bernier and the Cell agreed to push the plan to the following day. Superintendent Bernier and the Cell ultimately decided on February 15 that police lacked enough resources to action the plan immediately and that it would take 48 hours to mobilize enough POU officers to do so.

Chief Superintendent Pardy characterized the 6:11 p.m. briefing as a discussion that brought the Cell full circle to whether it was integrated with OPS or not. The Cell had two primary concerns: (1) Superintendent Bernier's plan was inconsistent with the February 13 Plan, and (2) it was not supported by enough resources. The Cell questioned whether

¹³ COM00000616.

¹⁴ OPP00001784 at PDF pp. 31-35.



it and OPS were working on the approved February 13 Plan, or whether OPS was instead acting unilaterally without consulting the Cell.

Chief Superintendent Pardy also observed that the plan that Superintendent Bernier presented at the February 14 at 6:11 p.m. briefing seemed uncharacteristic of him. In Chief Superintendent Pardy's experience, Superintendent Bernier was typically careful in his approach, but the plan he presented at the briefing was underdeveloped and had nothing in place to hold the areas to be cleared. All the Cell's subject-matter experts thought it was ill-fated. Chief Superintendent Pardy believed that someone was pushing Superintendent Bernier to act, but he did not know whether that person was Chief Sloly or one of Superintendent Bernier's own OPS subject matter experts. He did recall that Superintendent Bernier told him before Chief Sloly's resignation that he was worried about being removed as Event Commander if he did not action what Chief Sloly wanted.

On February 14 at 7:44 p.m., Chief Superintendent Pardy and Superintendent Lue spoke with Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson and informed her that OPS was planning to launch an operation on February 16. Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson told them that she was not aware of Superintendent Bernier's planned operation and that they were the first to inform her of it. Chief Superintendent Pardy and Superintendent Lue told her that the planned operation was unwise and would take away resources that would not be available to implement the February 13 Plan.

On February 15 at 7:30 a.m., Chief Superintendent Pardy and Superintendent Lue spoke with Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson again. Chief Superintendent Pardy's scribe notes record "we need everyone on the same page."¹⁵ Chief Superintendent Pardy explained during the interview that his POU experts were working hard and coming away united in the same direction, only to learn that the OPS senior command was interested in taking a different direction.

On February 15 at 9:15 a.m., Chief Superintendent Pardy spoke with Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson and Superintendent Bernier. Chief Superintendent Pardy's scribe notes record the following statement:¹⁶

"We made a plan and everyone agreed – when we move away from that plan that that [sic]. Why now – rush, rush."

He recalled having these conversations with Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson and Superintendent Pardy about the Cell's frustration that OPS had attempted to move away from the approved February 13 Plan.

On February 15 at 10:01 a.m., Chief Superintendent Pardy told members of the Cell that "there is not a unified command."¹⁷ Chief Superintendent Pardy explained during the

¹⁵ OPP00001785 at PDF p. 3.

¹⁶ *Id.* at PDF p. 9.

¹⁷ *Id.* at PDF p. 23.



interview that in an integrated or unified command, the key decision-makers are on the same page and keep each other informed. The progress towards integrated or unified command was undermined by Cell's discovery that OPS was looking to pursue an alternative plan that differed from the approved February 13 Plan that OPS and the Cell were supposed to be working on jointly to implement.

On February 15 at 10:30 a.m., Chief Superintendent Pardy spoke with Commissioner Carrique and Deputy Commissioner Rose DiMarco. His scribe notes from the call record the following statements:¹⁸

"[W]e are not part of the unified command."

"We are not a unified command. We are an adviser."

"We have not had the access of members of OPS."

"[E]lephant in the room is everything we have been doing so far – have been blocked by OPS Chief. Requesting your influence with organizing a true unified command."

Chief Superintendent Pardy and the Cell were very frustrated with Chief Sloly at the time. He had his finger on everything, and everything the Cell was attempting to accomplish had to go through him. As an example, the Cell had to brief Chief Sloly on February 12 even though Superintendent Bernier had already been appointed as the Event Commander by that date. Chief Superintendent Pardy indicated during the interview that Chief Sloly was trying to act as a de facto MIC, but that he was either not actually doing so or was doing so ineffectively. He was not making any fundamental decisions after being briefed or informed by subject matter experts. Rather, he was just making decisions about what he wanted to happen without consulting with the right subject matter experts. He neither made MIC-type decisions nor relied on his own team to inform those decisions.

Chief Superintendent Pardy knew that OPP were not the police of jurisdiction and did not have authority to go in and take over the situation in Ottawa. Commissioner Carrique never told him that he wanted OPP to take over the situation in Ottawa.

Effect of Chief Sloly's Resignation

Chief Sloly resigned on the morning of February 15. Upon his resignation, those leading OPS immediately supported the February 13 Plan. The implementation of the February 13 Plan moved more quickly after Chief Sloly's resignation. All the ambiguity concerning whether the plan had been approved disappeared. The discussions within OPS under Chief Sloly's leadership about whether to proceed with the plan likely delayed, by up to a

¹⁸ *Id.* at PDF pp. 26, 28.



few days, obtaining final approval for the Cell's plan. However, deploying the resources needed still required significant time.

By February 16, the Cell had developed a more detailed operational plan supported by sub-plans that was titled "Integrated Phased Approach." Chief Superintendent Pardy identified OPP00001852 as a later version of that plan.

By the time the plan was being readied for implementation, PLT negotiations were no longer effective as the protesters became more emboldened. PLT was meeting with resistance, negativity and aggression. The plan had contemplated this possibility and was adaptable. When it became unsafe for PLT to engage and negotiations were not working, police mobilized POUs from across the country.

Comparison of Integration in Ottawa and Windsor

Collaboration and integration between the local police of jurisdiction and OPP happened much more quickly and seamlessly in Windsor than it did in Ottawa. Chief Superintendent Pardy was not responsible for Windsor, but he was aware of and briefed on OPP's assistance to Windsor. He described the integration between OPP and the Windsor Police Service as a team of partners.

Impact of Emergency Declarations

Impact of Provincial Emergency Declaration

On February 11, the Premier of Ontario declared a province-wide emergency under the *Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act* (**EMCPA**). On February 13, Chief Superintendent Pardy ensured that the authorities granted under the EMCPA were communicated to officers serving in Ottawa, including frontline officers. He described the powers granted under the EMCPA as critical, especially the power the EMCPA granted to tow and hold vehicles without laying charges.

Impact of Federal Emergency Declaration

On February 14, the federal government declared a public order emergency under the *Emergencies Act*. The Cell had a lot of debate about the authorities the Act provided and needed to ensure frontline officers knew their authorities. Police used the Act to the full extent they could. A team of officers looked at the ability to freeze accounts.

Police in Ottawa did not need the *Emergencies Act* to tow vehicles. They tow vehicles all the time. It complemented police's ability to tow vehicles in a timely manner, but police would have done so anyway.



Police would have managed to put an end to the protests without the *Emergencies Act*. They would have done so within the timeline that the Cell was contemplating before the federal government declared an emergency.

Challenges and Recommendations

Chief Superintendent Pardy observed during the interview that police faced many challenges while policing the Freedom Convoy in Ottawa and made recommendations to address some of these challenges:

- 1) Resource mobilization and logistics
 - Police had to employ three or more staging areas because no single place could accommodate all officers, but a single location would have facilitated integration and camaraderie.
 - OPS had to pull vehicles out of retirement to provide vehicles for officers being flown into Ottawa.
- 2) Interprovincial policing accreditation
 - This was a challenge, but the *Emergencies Act* helped overcome it.
- 3) Communication
- 4) Level of integration
 - It is important to integrate as soon as an event overwhelms the capacity of a single agency. It could be useful to enshrine the need to integrate in legislation once a single agency has been overwhelmed.
 - Integration permits subject matter experts to focus on the work at hand.
- 5) Weather
- 6) Officer wellness
 - Chief Superintendent Pardy observed officers experiencing physical and mental wellness challenges. He made referrals and asked for OPP's psychologist to attend.
- 7) Effectively shutting down the downtown
 - Police were able to shut down the downtown because it was not a long distance from Highway 417 to downtown. OPS should always be able to shut down the downtown.
 - TPS learned from the Ottawa situation and it blocked access to Queen's Park when protestors attempted to protest there so that trucks could not embed themselves in downtown Toronto.
 - OPS should have a core hardening plan for when it needs to limit access to downtown Ottawa, whether that plan involves gates, officers standing behind their



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cruisers, or using buses. OPS needs to be able to mobilize quickly to implement that plan.

8) Politics

- The Freedom Convoy was politically charged at the local, provincial, and national levels, and it polarized Canada. OPS was under pressure to act, including political pressure.